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PREVIEW; Ramon v. Short: Local Authority in the Context of 
Federal Immigration Detention Requests 
 
Joseph D. Weaver* 
 
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in 
this matter on Wednesday, January 8, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom 
of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, 
Helena, Montana. Alex Rate will likely appear on behalf of the Appellant. 




This case presents two significant issues. The preliminary issue is 
whether the mootness doctrine prevents review of the district court’s 
refusal to enjoin the Lincoln County Sheriff from detaining an inmate 
pursuant to a federal immigration detainer request.1 If the claim is not 
moot, or if an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, the core issue is 
whether Montana law authorizes the Sheriff to detain a person pursuant to 
a federal immigration detainer request.2  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On August 3, 2018, Agustin Ramon was arrested on a burglary 
charge and held in the Lincoln County Jail with a $25,000 bond.3 That 
same day, United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued 
an immigration detainer request for Ramon, requesting the jail detain 
Ramon for up to 48 hours after he was entitled to release on the burglary 
charge.4 The detainer request stated that a border patrol agent had probable 
cause to believe Ramon was unlawfully present in the United States in 
violation of civil immigration law.5   
On August 17, 2018, a bondsman notified Lincoln County Jail that 
he intended to post bond for Ramon.6 Jail officials notified the bondsman 
that he was free to post bond, but Ramon would remain detained pursuant 
 
* Candidate for J.D. 2020, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana 
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Ramon v. Short (Mont. July 12, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661); 
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief at 3, Ramon v. Short (Mont. Sept. 9, 2019) (No. 
DA 18-0661). 
2 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2; Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, 
supra note 1, at 7. 
3 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.  
4 Id. at 3. 
5 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States in Support of Appellee Darren Short at 6, Ramon v. 
Short (Mont. Sept. 3, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661). 
6 Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 1.  
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to the detainer request even if the bond were paid.7 The bondsman did not 
post bond for Ramon, and no other individual attempted to post bond.8  
On October 30, 2018, Ramon filed a complaint in state district court 
alleging that his continued detention violated Montana law.9 Ramon 
applied for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
concurrently with his complaint.10 The district court denied his application 
and held that Ramon was legally detained under Montana Code Annotated 
§ 7-32-2203(3).11 Ramon remained in state custody until sentencing on 
February 11, 2019, at which point he was released and transferred to the 
custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).12 
Ramon timely appealed the district court’s decision.13 The Sheriff 
moved to dismiss the appeal as moot on the grounds that Ramon is no 
longer in the state’s custody, and, therefore, injunctive relief is 
impossible.14 The Montana Supreme Court denied the Sheriff’s motion to 
dismiss. The Court then directed the parties to submit briefs on whether an 
exception to the mootness doctrine applies and whether Montana law 
authorizes state law enforcement to extend a person’s detention pursuant 
to a federal detainer request.15   
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
Ramon argues the Court should hear the merits of the case because 
two exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.16 First, Ramon asserts the 
“public interest exception” applies because the extent of Montana officers’ 
authority to make civil immigration arrests presents a question of 
exceptional public importance, and resolution of the issue is necessary to 
guide law enforcement in the performance of their duties.17 Second, 
Ramon argues the issue is not moot because it is “capable of repetition yet 
evading review.”18 On the merits, Ramon argues that holding a person 
pursuant to an immigration detainer constitutes a new arrest, and the 
Sheriff lacks authority to make civil immigration arrests.19  
 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–32–2203(3) (2019) (“Who may be confined in a detention center. 
Detention centers are used as follows: . . . for the confinement of persons committed for contempt or 
upon civil process or by other authority of law . . . .”).  
12 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 6. 
13 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 5. 
14 Id. at 6.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 6, 9 (citing Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group v. 
Board of Cty Comm’rs, 260 P.3d 133, 137 (Mont. 2011)). 
18 Id. at 6 (citing Gateway Opencut, 260 P.3d at 137). 
19Id. at 7–8.  
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In response, the Sheriff argues that Ramon’s appeal is moot because 
Ramon is no longer detained in the jail, and therefore Ramon is unable to 
obtain injunctive relief.20 The Sheriff also asserts that no exception to the 
mootness doctrine applies.21 If the Court reaches the merits of the claim, 
the Sheriff argues that Montana law authorizes civil detention pursuant to 
immigration detainer requests.22  
   
A. Appellant Ramon’s Argument 
 
Ramon argues the Court should apply an exception to the mootness 
doctrine and reach the merits of his claim because Montana law 
enforcement needs guidance on whether it has the authority to make civil 
immigration arrests.23 The extent of a sheriff’s power to deprive Montana 
residents of liberty is a question of utmost importance.24 Without a ruling 
on the merits, sheriffs will continue to detain individuals pursuant to CPB 
detainer requests, undermining fundamental liberty interests.25 Ramon 
argues this issue is certain to recur, as Montana counties received 135 CBP 
detainer requests from 2017 through 2018.26 Furthermore, the issue will 
continue to evade review because the requested 48-hour detention period 
is “too short in duration” for an inmate to challenge the detention’s 
legality, especially on appeal, before the inmate is released from state 
custody and transferred to DHS.27 
On the merits, Ramon’s argument is twofold. First, he contends the 
Sheriff effectuated a new arrest by keeping Ramon in jail for a new 
purpose after he was otherwise entitled to release.28 When jail officials told 
the bondsman they would not release Ramon even if his bond were posted, 
a “reasonable person would not have felt free to walk away under the 
circumstances.”29 Furthermore, immigration detention constitutes arrest 
because it results in “actual restraint of the person to be arrested.”30 
Because it constitutes an arrest, the Sheriff needs authority under Montana 
law to effectuate the arrest.31 Second, Ramon argues the Sheriff does not 
have authority to effectuate an arrest pursuant to CBP detainers, and 
 
20 Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 2.  
21 Id. at 2.  
22 Id. at 7. 
23 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9. 
24 Id. at 9.  
25 Id. at 10, 13.  
26 Id. at 11 (citing Trans. Records Access Clearinghouse, Syr. Univ., Latest Data: ICE Detainers 
(Dec. 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detain/). 
27 Id. at 11, 12, 13–14 (citing Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group v. Board Of Cty Comm’rs, 
260 P.3d 133, 137 (Mont. 2011)). 
28 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 14. 
29 Id. at 15 (citing State v. Ellington, 143 P.3d 119, 122 (Mont. 2006)). 
30 Id. at 15; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-104 (2019).  
31 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17–18 (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 
305 (1958)).  
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therefore, such a detention is unlawful.32 In particular, he argues the 
district court erroneously relied on § 7–32–2203(3) in justifying the 
Sheriff’s arrest because the statute does not confer arrest authority. Rather, 
it describes who may be confined in jail after a valid arrest or sentence.33  
 
B. Appellee Sheriff Short’s Argument 
 
The Sheriff’s principal argument is that Ramon’s appeal is moot.34 
The Court is unable to grant injunctive relief from the Sheriff’s detention 
because Ramon is no longer in the Sheriff’s custody.35 Therefore, the 
appeal is moot because it no longer presents a justiciable controversy.36 
The Sheriff argues the public interest exception does not apply because the 
claim does not involve a question of exceptional public importance.37 
Further, he contends the “capable of repetition yet evading review” 
exception requires that the same complaining party will be subject to the 
same practice again.38 Since Ramon has already been released from the 
Sheriff’s custody and transferred to DHS, it is unlikely Ramon will be 
subject to another immigration detainer, and therefore the exception does 
not apply.39  
If the claim is not moot, the Sheriff maintains that Ramon’s detention 
was lawful because he did not effectuate a new arrest.40 Specifically, he 
contends Ramon was never detained pursuant to the detainer request 
because he was never “otherwise free to leave” the state’s custody.41 
Rather, Ramon remained incarcerated pursuant to the state’s burglary 
charges until sentencing, and then he was immediately released to DHS 
custody.42 Ramon never posted bond and the state’s charges had not yet 
been resolved.43 However, even if a new arrest occurred, the Sheriff argues 
that Montana law authorizes detention pursuant to immigration detainers 
because local jails may confine persons committed upon “civil process.”44 
He argues immigration is a civil process under federal law, and, therefore, 
the Sheriff has the authority to hold inmates pursuant to detainer 
requests.45 
 
32 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 14. 
33 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 14; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2203(3) (2019). 
34 See generally Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 3.  
35 Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 3.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 5. 
38 Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Zunski v. 
Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep’t Bd. Of Trustees, 309 P.3d 21, 25–26 (Mont. 2013)).  
39 Id. at 5–7.  
40 Id. at 7.  
41 Id. at 5, 7.  
42 Id. at 7.  
43 Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 7. 
44 Id. at 8–9; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2203(3) (2019). 
45 Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 9. 






The Court will likely apply an exception to the mootness doctrine and 
reach the merits of the claim to clarify the extent of local law 
enforcement’s authority to comply with federal immigration detainers. In 
particular, the Court’s directive to the parties to brief the issue on the 
merits indicates its desire to resolve the issue.46 The Court may determine 
that the issue is of exceptional public importance because it implicates 
detainees’ fundamental liberty interests.47 In the alternative, it may hold 
the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review because immigration 
detention will likely affect other inmates in the future, even if it no longer 
affects Ramon.48 Either way, the Court will likely reach the merits of the 
case.  
 
B. Immigration Detention 
 
The threshold question on the merits is whether holding a person 
pursuant to an immigration detainer request constitutes a new arrest. Under 
Montana law, “an arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be 
arrested or by the person’s submission to the custody of the person making 
the arrest.”49 Arrest is accorded a broad definition in Montana and is 
determined by whether a reasonable person would have felt free to walk 
away under the circumstances.50 Ramon presents a strong argument as to 
why his detention constituted an arrest.51 His bondsman was notified that 
posting bond would be “futile” due to the immigration detainer,52 and the 
Sheriff kept the jail door locked indicating Ramon was not free to leave.53  
 
46 Order at 2, Ramon v. Bowe (Mont. May 28, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661). Roby Bowe was Sheriff of 
Lincoln County at the time the initial complaint was filed. The current Sheriff of Lincoln County, 
Darren Short, has been substituted for Roby Bowe. In its Order, the Court acknowledges it is unable 
to enjoin the Sheriff but still directs the parties to “brief the merits of Ramon’s arguments . . . .” 
47 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10, 13. 
48 See, e.g., Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003) (Court reached the merits of former 
detainee’s challenge to certain jail practices even after detainee was released because other inmates 
could be subjected to the same practices); Wier v. Lincoln Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 925 P.2d 1172 
(Mont. 1996) (Court reached merits of inmate’s challenge to bail denial even though he had already 
been released); Matter of N.B., 620 P.2d 1228 (Mont. 1980) (Court applied exception to mootness 
without considering whether the plaintiff was likely to face the challenged policy again because 
other Montanans were subject to the same policy). 
49 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-104 (2019). 
50 State v. Ellington, 143 P.3d 119, 122 (Mont. 2006). 
51 See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15–17; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6-11, 
Ramon v. Short (Mont. Sept. 23, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661). 
52 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 51, at 6. 
53 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15. 
58 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 80 
 
 
In general, however, the Court may interpret immigration detainers 
not as new arrests, but as “temporary extension[s] of current custody.” 54 
In other words, an immigration detainer merely assists CBP in effecting 
its own arrest procedure; after the Sheriff’s brief extension of custody, the 
inmate is transferred to CBP and CBP effects the new arrest under valid 
procedures.55 Under either interpretation, the Court’s holding will clarify 
whether extension of custody constitutes arrest, whether continued 
detention constitutes arrest, and whether immigration detention constitutes 
arrest.   
The next crucial determination is whether the Sheriff has authority to 
detain a person pursuant to CBP immigration detainers. On one hand, the 
Court may hold that the district court erroneously relied on § 7-32-2203(3) 
as granting the Sheriff authority to arrest. Even if the statute provided 
authority to arrest on “civil process,” it still might not authorize detention 
because immigration detainers do not constitute “process” under Montana 
law.56 “Process means a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial 
proceedings.”57 An immigration detainer is issued by DHS, not a judicial 
officer, and, therefore, it is not issued in the course of judicial proceedings 
and might not constitute a process under Montana law. 58 On the other 
hand, the Court may frame the Sheriff’s authority in terms of cooperation 
with a federal agency.59 The federal government retains power over the 
subject of immigration and the status of aliens.60 Local law enforcement 
may cooperate with DHS in the detention of aliens when that cooperation 
is pursuant to a request from the federal government.61 If the Court chooses 
this route, it will need to resolve state sovereignty and other preemption 
issues.62  
Both Ramon and the Sheriff are supported by persuasive policy 
considerations. Amici Curiae in support of Ramon explain that DHS has 
improperly issued immigration detainers to target and extradite the 
immigrant population in recent years, regardless of whether that 
 
54 See Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 4, 8. DHS’s detainer form requests 
local law enforcement to “[m]aintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 
HOURS . . . beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your 
custody.” Department of Homeland Security Form I-247A at 1, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (emphasis original). 
55 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 8.  
56 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 27; Brief of Amicus Curiae Montana Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (MTACDL) at 5–6, Ramon v. Short (Mont. July 19, 2019) (No. DA 18-
0661). 
57 MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-202(5) (2019) 
58 8 C.F.R.§ 287.7(b) (2019). 
59 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 1–5.  
60 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012). 
61 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2019). 
62 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 8–10; Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra 
note 51, at 19–20.  
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population poses a threat to public safety.63 For example, in Montana 54 
percent of DHS immigration detainers were issued in 2012 against 
immigrants with no criminal convictions.64 On the other hand, an 
immigration detainer demonstrates that a CBP officer has probable cause 
to believe an alien has violated federal immigration law and is legally 
subject to extradition.65 By complying with detainer requests, a sheriff 
cooperates with the federal government’s efforts to enforce civil 
immigration law.66 Ultimately, however, when balancing the interests of 
individual liberty with the interest of law and enforcement, the Court tends 
to protect the individual liberty interests.  
As such, it is anticipated that the Court will ultimately conclude that 
holding a person pursuant to an immigration detainer request constitutes 
an arrest, and the Sheriff does not have authority under Montana law to 
effectuate the arrest. An immigration detainer asks the Sheriff to keep 
someone in jail after they would otherwise be entitled to release. Such a 
request clearly undermines a person’s liberty because they would be free 
to leave jail but for CBP’s request for further detention. Considering 
Montana’s broad definition of arrest, immigration detention probably 
constitutes arrest. Furthermore, the district court likely erred in holding 
that § 7-32-2203(3) provides the Sheriff with the necessary authority to 
effectuate an immigration detention. That statute does not confer explicit 
arrest authority, and the Court should interpret statutes carefully when 




This case concerns whether state law enforcement may extend an 
individual’s arrest pursuant to a CBP detainer request. Before ruling on 
the merits, the Court must find an exception to mootness. In doing so, the 
Court would have an opportunity to clarify the extent of Montana law 
enforcements’ authority regarding federal immigration detainers. The 
Court’s holding will affect local law enforcement, detainees, and 
immigrants residing in Montana.        
 
63 Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause at 3–5, Ramon v. Short (July 12, 2019) (No. DA 
18-0661). 
64 Id. at 5 (citing Trans. Rec. Access Clearinghouse, Targeting of ICE Detainers Varies Widely by 
State and by Facility Tbl. 2 (Feb. 11, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/343/).  
65 8 C.F.R. § 287.7; 8 U.S.C. § 1182, 1227. 
66 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 17–18.  
